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Introduction
Recent years have seen substantial volatility in food prices with dramatic spikes in 2008 and 2011 (see, for example, von Braun and Tadesse 2012). Food security has become one of the key strategic issues for international policy coordination with many supranational organizations launching food security initiatives. 1 Next to improvements along the entire supply chain, better coordination in times of signi…cant parallel crop failures between exporting countries and food traders has been advocated (see, for example, EBRD 2012).
In most crop markets, there is no direct trade between sellers in exporting countries and buyers abroad. Rather trade is facilitated through companies that buy and sell on both In this paper we examine a simple model of the world grain market that captures the basic strategic interplay between exporting countries and oligopolistic traders. There are two exporting countries, each comprising a continuum of consumers, a competitive farming sector and a government that can impose export tari¤s and aims to maximize a weighted sum of all domestic rents. There are also two traders with duopsony power vis-à-vis the farmers who reside in the exporting countries and duopoly power vis-à-vis grain buyers who reside in the rest of the world (which we model via a simple demand function). Timing is such that after both harvests are realized (which are perfectly observed) both governments set export tari¤s. Subsequently, traders simultaneously decide which quantities they want to buy and sell. The model is set out in Section 2.
In Section 3 we solve our model assuming non-cooperative behavior of the four strategic actors. We establish two reasons why export tari¤s can steeply rise in response to poor harvests. The …rst reason is perhaps not so surprising: export tari¤s can be shown to be strategic complements which, once one country sees itself forced to raise its tari¤, implies that the other will follow suit, which in turn puts further pressure on the …rst country's tari¤.
The second reason is more intricate and due to the fact that the subgame played by traders -after tari¤s have been set -may have multiple equilibria. Speci…cally, if multiplicity arises, there will be one equilibrium where traders buy from both countries and one equilibrium where traders buy all their grain from only one of the two export countries. While both governments would prefer the …rst equilibrium, it can be shown that the second equilibrium is payo¤ dominant for the traders and thus arguably more likely to arise in the subgame. The government of the country that would sell grain to the traders in this subgame equilibrium can, however, avoid the trap of becoming the single exporter -simply through raising its tari¤ so dramatically that it becomes attractive again for the traders to buy from both countries.
This e¤ect generates interesting non-monotonicities in equilibrium tari¤s. If we …x country 2's harvest at some intermediate level and vary the harvest in country 1, we …nd that for extreme crop failures in country 1, country 2 will be the sole exporter and set medium export tari¤. When country 1's harvest passes a certain threshold, country 2 can suddenly avoid the trap of becoming the sole supplier and will dramatically increase its tari¤. For further increases in country 1's harvest, both countries will gradually reduce their tari¤s.
Beyond another threshold, country 2 will continue to set lower tari¤s but, remarkably, country 1's tari¤ will be increasing in its own harvest. For bumper crops, raising income from the tari¤ becomes an export country's dominant motive.
Examining equilibrium pro…ts and welfare in more detail, we …nd some surprising results of which at least one is worrying. We …nd that both, world welfare and aggregate consumer surplus can decrease as harvests increase, namely exactly at the point where export tari¤s peak in order to ensure that traders will buy from both countries. More worryingly, we …nd that traders can bene…t from poor harvests in one of the countries. As in practice the traders also provide much of the local infrastructure to store and transport grain, this result may imply that in some countries their initial incentive to invest into such infrastructure might be negative.
Finally, we examine the case of cooperation among exporting countries. Surprisingly, we …nd that such cooperation can bene…t all agents in our model: not only export countries would experience higher total welfare, but also traders and the world's consumers. In other words, in our model an OPEC-like organization for grain exporting countries can increase world welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the formal model and analyze its non-cooperative solution. In Section 3 we study a simple example to illustrate some of the more surprising properties of the grain market. This section also includes the analysis of cooperative behavior among export countries. In Section 4 we discuss some of the related trade and IO literature and we conclude in Section 5.
Model
We study a simple model of the world's grain market with two exporting countries and two grain traders. Farmers in export countries i = 1; 2 are price takers and sell their grain domestically as well as to the two traders k = 1; 2 who then supply it to the rest of the world. Traders have, thus, both, duopsony and duopoly power. The other agents with strategic power in our model are the governments in exporting countries who can set export tari¤s and are assumed to maximize a weighted sum of domestic farmers'pro…ts, domestic consumer welfare, and tari¤ income.
The timing is as follows: First, harvests are realized in both countries. Harvests determine the total supply x i in each country i. Observing both harvests, governments set export tari¤s, t i . Finally, observing harvests and tari¤s, traders decide about the quantities, x k , they want to trade and all markets clear.
Inverse domestic demand in export country i is given by
and inverse demand on the world market is given by P (x) with P 0 < 0 = P 00 :
Demand on the world market is exclusively served by the two traders who can buy from the two countries i = 1; 2 as well as from an exogenously given (competitive) supply,
Farmers in export country i act as price takers and decide how much they supply on the domestic market and how much they sell to the traders for export. Let x S i denote the total quantity provided for export in country i and let p t denote the export price that farmers receive from the traders. The quantity supplied to the domestic market is accordingly
Farmers'pro…ts in country i are
and the government has tari¤ income t i x S i . We assume that governments maximize a weighted sum of all domestic rents,
being the weighting attached to consumer welfare. This weighting function allows us to model the pressure that consumers/voters may be able to exert on governments, in particular, in times of food shortages. Essentially, it will force governments to make sure that domestic consumers will not starve and, thus, create an incentive for introducing export tari¤s beyond raising income.
In the following we will …rst impose market clearing conditions (for both domestic markets and the world market) to derive the equilibrium quantities that the traders will choose for given export tari¤s. After that we will determine equilibrium tari¤s set by the governments.
Equilibrium Quantities
The total export quantity of country i is determined by observing that the farmers will have to be indi¤erent between selling their grain to the traders or selling it domestically.
We can write this indi¤erence condition as
The supply function X S i (x i ; t i ; p t ) is continuous and piecewise di¤erentiable:
Note that there always exist a t i such that X S i (x i ; t i ; p t ) 2 (0; x i ), that is, a tari¤ such that some but not all grain will be exported.
Before we state the market clearing condition, we need a few further bits of notation. For simplicity, let t and x denote the tuples t = (t 1 ; t 2 ) and x = (x 1 ; x 2 ) and de…ne x as the total quantity traded by both traders, that is, x = x 1 + x 2 . Then, market clearing imposes that P t (x; x; t) is implicitly given by
Analyzing the properties of P t (x; x; t) with respect to x and t we will restrict the analysis to cases where there is some domestic grain consumption in both exporting countries, that is, where X S i (x i ; t i ; p t ) 2 [0; x i ) for i = 1; 2. We …rst state Lemma 1 P t (x; x; t) is continuous, strictly increasing and piecewise di¤ erentiable in x.
Moreover, 8x such that P t (x; x; t) 6 = P i (x i ) + t i for i = 1; 2
and 8x such that P t (x; x; t) = P i (x i ) + t i for at least one i 2 f1; 2g lim e x%x @P t (e x; x; t) @e x > lim e x&x @P t (e x; x; t) @e x :
All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
The lemma shows that traders face a kinked supply curve. Price rise less steeply when both countries supply grain to the world market. This will turn out to be an important property of the model.
Considering the impact of t i and x i on P t (x; x; t), we obtain
The lemma states the intuitive results that the prices that traders will have to pay fall in countries'harvests and rise in countries'export tari¤s.
Having characterized the market clearing prices P t (x; x; t) and P (x), we can now formulate the maximization problem of each trader (k; l = 1; 2 and k 6 = l)
De…ning trader k's best reply to trader l's choice as
we …rst establish the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proposition 1 A symmetric equilibrium X k (x; t) = X l (x; t) = X (x; t) in pure strategies always exists. Furthermore, any equilibrium (X k (x; t); X l (x; t)) in pure strategies is symmetric as long as P t (X k (x; t) + X l (x; t); x; t) 6 = P i (0) + t i for i = 1; 2.
Note that Proposition 1 does not exclude multiple or asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies. Analyzing this possibility more carefully we obtain the following two corollaries.
) with h = 1; 2; ::; m and P t (2X h (x; t)); x; t) 6 = P i (0)+t i for i = 1; 2 exist, we have m 3. The lowest and highest equilibrium quantities X (x; t) < X (x; t) are such that P t (2X (x; t)); x; t) < P i (x i ) + t i < P t (2X (x; t)); x; t) for at least one i 2 f1; 2g :
Corollary 2 Asymmetric equilibria with X k (x; t) 6 = X l (x; t) exist only if P t (X k (x; t) + X l (x; t); x; t) = P i (0) + t i for at least one i 2 f1; 2g : Proposition 1 and Corollaries 1 and 2 are based on the observation that if X r k (x l ; x; t) is unique, it is a decreasing function in x l with a slope greater than 1. Furthermore, while a trader's best reply may involve 'upward jumps', it never entails 'downward jumps'.
The existence of asymmetric equilibria is simply due to the fact that P t (x; x; t) has a upward kink at P t (x; x; t) = P i (0) + t i for at least one i 2 f1; 2g which also implies that @X r k (x l ; x; t)/ @x l = 1 at x l such that P t (X r k + x l ; x; t) = P i (0) + t i . It is worthwhile to re ‡ect upon the corollaries for a moment. They show that there are equilibria where the traders purchase all grain from just one of the two exporting countries.
As we will see in more detail below this is not necessarily good news for this country as domestic consumer rents su¤er signi…cantly. Indeed, we will see further below how governments will adjust tari¤s in order to avoid becoming the sole supplier.
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For later reference we now characterize the comparative static properties of the symmetric equilibria. Assuming that a unique symmetric equilibrium exists and de…ning P t (t; x) := P t (2X (x; t)); x; t) and X S i (x; t) := X S i (x i ; t i ; P t (t; x)) we obtain Lemma 3 Assume that a unique symmetric equilibrium X (x; t) = X k (x; t) = X l (x; t)
exists and x i > X S i (x; t) > 0 for at least one i 2 f1; 2g. Then,
Furthermore, any increase in t i decreases the trader's pro…ts, i.e. @ k (x; t)/ @t i < 0:
Turning to the situation with two (or more) symmetric equilibria we get Lemma 4 Assume that two symmetric equilibria X (x; t) and X (x; t) such that X (x; t) < X (x; t) and P i (x i )+t i < P t (2X (x; t)); x; t) < P j (x i )+t j < P t (2X (x; t)); x; t)
for i 6 = j exist. Then, the traders' pro…ts are higher when X (x; t) is chosen, i.e.
Furthermore, a high enough increase (decrease) of t i leads to the existence of a unique equilibrium with the higher (lower) quantities. The same holds vice versa for an increase (decrease) of t j .
While Lemma 3 resembles some standard results in simple Cournot games, Lemma 4 con…rms that a low-quantity equilibrium (where only one of the two countries is actually exporting grain) is payo¤ dominant for the traders. Furthermore, by changing their export tari¤s accordingly the governments can ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium in which the export quantities of both countries are positive.
Export Tari¤s
Turning to the decision problem of the government in country i we have to take into account that -given the export tari¤s of both countries -multiple equilibria may exist 9 in the second stage of the game where traders choose quantities. We therefore proceed by analyzing the decision problem of the government in country i assuming that its optimal tari¤ is such that the equilibrium in the second stage of the game is unique. We then turn to the case where multiple equilibria may exist.
The decision problem of the government in country i can be written as (assuming that a unique symmetric equilibrium X (x; t) exists and using
To characterize the solution of this maximization problem note …rst that W i is continuous in t i and twice continuously di¤erentiable in t as long as a unique equilibrium X (x; t)
exists,
Consider …rst the potential corner solutions with either
and assuming di¤erentiability we obtain Lemma 5 Assume that W i is di¤ erentiable for t i = t max i " and t i = t min i + " with " > 0 small enough. Any t i t max i can be optimal for government i only if
Any t i t min i cannot be optimal for government i as long as
In other words, with su¢ cient weight on domestic consumer rents and small enough harvests, governments might decide to impose prohibitive export tari¤s equivalent to export bans. At the same time, as long as the relative weight on domestic consumer surplus is never smaller than 1, a government will never choose a tari¤ such that all grain will be exported.
Turning to interior solutions, country i's best reply is given by
Characterizing t r i (t j ; x) in more detail we obtain Lemma 6 If max t i W i ( ) has an interior solution t r i (t i ; x) such that a unique equilibrium X (x; t) exists, t r i (t i ; x) is unique and implicitly given by
The impact of x i on t r i is determined by
Furthermore, assume that t r i (t i ; x) leads to 0 < X S j (x; t) < x j . Then,
Corollary 3 shows one of the key reasons for volatility in food prices: export tari¤s are strategic complements. Hence, if one country sees itself forced to raise export tari¤s, another country will optimally respond by following suit which will trigger further tari¤ rises by the …rst country and so on until a new equilibrium is reached.
The next lemma will show that governments would always like the other country to impose an even stricter tari¤ as long as this does not imply a total stop of exports.
Lemma 7
If max t i W i ( ) has an interior solution t r i (t i ; x) such that a unique equilibrium X (x; t) exists, W i is increasing in t i :
> 0 as long as 0 < X S j (x; t) < x j :
Turning to the possibility that multiple equilibria may exist in the second stage of the game, the next lemma will show that by changing their export tari¤s the governments can ensure the existence of a unique subgame equilibrium. Evaluating the governments' objective functions we get Lemma 8 Assume that t r i (t i ; x) leads to two equilibria X (x; t) < X (x; t) and that t r i (t i ; x) maximizes W i given that X (x; t) is played. Then, if either P i (x i ) + t r i < P t (2X (x; t)); x; t) < P j (x j ) + t j < P t (2X (x; t)); x; t) or P j (x j ) + t j < P t (2X (x; t)); x; t) < P i (x i ) + t r i < P t (2X (x; t)); x; t)
holds for i 6 = j, government i is strictly better o¤ if the equilibrium with the higher quantities is played.
If multiple equilibria in the second stage of the game (where traders choose quantities) exist, both governments are strictly better of if the traders play the high-quantity equilibrium. However, as we have seen before this is not in the interest of the traders who prefer the low-quantity equilibrium. Taking into account Lemma 4 and assuming that the traders select the payo¤ dominant equilibrium, we …nd that there might also be multiplicity in equilibrium tari¤s. More speci…cally, using Lemmas 5 to 8 and assuming V 0 i (0) > 1 as well as concavity of V i (CR i (x)) for the relevant quantities, we obtain Proposition 2 If an equilibrium with interior solutions for both governments and a unique symmetric equilibrium in the second stage of the game exist, the equilibrium export tari¤ s are unique. Assuming that traders coordinate on payo¤ dominant equilibria, multiple equilibrium export tari¤ s exist if it is optimal for both governments to ensure that the export quantities of both countries are strictly positive.
In order to characterize these possibilities in more detail we now turn to a speci…c numerical example.
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Example
In order to highlight some of the more surprising e¤ects that can arise in our model we now study a simple numerical example. Let the inverse demand functions be P 1 (x) = 2 x; P 2 (x) = 2 x; P (x) = 4 x and the governments'objective function
Supply is
In the following we assume a …xed harvest for country 2,
and will vary harvests of country 1 in order to study di¤erent equilibrium phenomena that may arise. Throughout we assume that traders can coordinate on payo¤ dominant equilibria in the second stage of the game.
Non-cooperative Solution
Let us …rst examine for which harvests of country 1 we obtain unique or multiple equilibria in the tari¤ game. Using payo¤ dominance as a selection criterion in stage two, we …nd that for i)
there is a unique interior equilibrium in the tari¤ game with
ii) x 1 2 [1:103; 1:188] there are multiple equilibria in the tari¤ game that induce unique subgame equilibria X (x; t) with X S 1 > 0 iii)
there is a unique equilibrium in the tari¤ game such that For larger harvests, country 1 increases its tari¤s as harvests get bigger. Raising income from the tari¤ dominates policy. However, for smaller harvests, the comparative static is reversed. Now country 1 wants to protect domestic consumers and increases tari¤s as harvests get smaller. This forces the government of country 2 to impose very large tari¤s in order to avoid that it becomes the sole exporting nation. This is precisely the range we have been discussing already above where countries impose high tari¤s in order to avoid that traders coordinate on a low-quantity equilibrium where they purchase all their grain from one country only. Finally, for really bad harvests country 1 has no other choice but to impose a complete export ban, in response to which country 2 can reduce its tari¤.
Turning to welfare e¤ects of changes in x 1 and considering …rst the equilibrium quantities traded on the world market we obtain the graphs depicted in Figure 2 . can reduce its tari¤ even faster and raise its exports until reaching an interior maximum.
Equilibrium pro…ts of the traders and aggregate social welfare measured as the sum of (unweighted) consumers' surplus, tax revenues and pro…ts on all markets are shown in 
Cooperation between the Countries
In order to analyze the potential gains from coordination between the countries, we assume that cooperation simply induces the countries to choose their export tari¤s such that the sum of governmental welfare is maximized:
max Analyzing this maximization problem and again assuming that the traders can coordinate on payo¤ dominant equilibria, we get the following
Result 1
The cooperatively optimal export tari¤ s t c 1 and t c 2 are such that both countries have strictly positive exports while making sure that the low-quantity equilibrium ceases to exist.
More speci…cally, comparing the equilibrium tari¤s with and without cooperation we get the graphs shown in Figure 4 . For later reference, note that there exists a x k 1 such that the highest equilibrium tari¤s without cooperation are exactly equal to t c 1 and t c 2 and that we have t 1 < t c 1 and t 2 < t c 2 for all x 1 > x k 1 . Considering aggregate consumer surplus and low harvests in country 1, note that the total quantity o¤ered in both countries and on the world market, i.e. x 1 + x 2 + X S , is higher with cooperation as it allows the countries to avoid the low quantity equilibrium where only country 2 exports. Furthermore, x 1 + x 2 + X S is increasing in the countries' export tari¤s. Therefore, aggregate consumer surplus is higher with cooperation between the countries for x 1 < 1:103 and for x 1 > x k 1 (see Figure 5 ). If we examine consumer surplus in import countries and on the world market separately, we …nd that cooperation bene…ts the world market consumers for all x 1 < 1:103 and as along as t c 1 < t 1 and t c 2 < t 2 . With x 1 > x k 1 and t c 1 > t 1 and t c 2 > t 2 consumers on the world market su¤er from cooperation between exporting countries while consumers in these countries bene…t.
Turning to the traders'pro…ts and aggregate social welfare, we obtain the graphs shown in Figure 6 . While it is not surprising that cooperation has opposite e¤ects on aggregate consumer surplus and traders'pro…ts, our main result is that cooperation can lead to higher aggregate social welfare. This is the case whenever non-cooperation would lead to either higher export tari¤s of both countries or to an equilibrium in which only country 2 exports.
However, cooperation lowers aggregate social welfare if it induces both countries to choose tari¤s above their non-cooperative equilibrium tari¤s, i.e., for relatively large harvests in country 1, x 1 > x k 1 .
Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst paper to study the subtle strategic interplay between grain traders and export countries that have an incentive to introduce export tari¤s to protect domestic grain prices. While our model does not directly build on previous work, there are some earlier studies with results that partially relate to ours. ternational markets, especially in markets for primary commodities and in the case of developing economies. They use a partial equilibrium approach to show that the optimal policy for a price-taking country that faces a trading oligopsony is to introduce an export tari¤ in order to shift monopoly rents back into the country. The optimal tari¤ is shown to be negatively correlated with market concentration. Their analysis is limited to the relationship between a single, price taking country and the traders and is silent on tari¤ wars caused by non-cooperative strategic interaction between governments.
Oladi and Gilbert (2012) augment Deardor¤ and Rajaraman's approach by introducing rivalling governments confronted with traders engaged in Cournot competition. They …nd that the optimal policy is not necessarily an export tari¤ but might, in fact, be an export subsidy, depending on the export elasticity. They explain their result with the fact that the governments compete for a shift of both rents, own and other. The model assumes a government that is only maximizing tax revenues and producer's pro…ts and does not capture the special role of food in a government's rationale.
Conclusion
In recent years world food prices have experienced unprecedented levels of volatility and have entered the focus of policy makers. Spikes in food prices not only harm the poor but have the potential to cause political unrest (Schneider 2008 , Bush 2010 ,. Bellemare 2011) demonstrates how food rising food prices and political instability are intertwined, using natural disasters to establish causality. This political pressure is key in our modelthat governments may get increasingly worried when domestic food prices rise -which is re ‡ected in how governments weigh consumer rent in our model.
In case of crop failures this shifts the rationale for export tari¤s from income generation to domestic price protection. As export tari¤s are shown to be strategic complements a tari¤ war can be the consequence. Such tari¤ wars become exacerbated when oligopsonistic grain traders prefer to switch to low-quantity equilibria in which they buy all their grain from just one country. This (counterfactual) scenario can put so much pressure on this country that it has to increase export tari¤s to force traders to buy not only from them.
This scenario has huge adverse e¤ects for the world market and the traders.
Cooperation between exporting countries can avoid the pitfalls of such tari¤ escalation.
Remarkably, collusive behavior of export nations can also bene…t traders. As extreme spikes in food prices are avoided, traders can buy and sell more grain at cheaper prices, bene…tting them and the world's consumers.
There has been much debate about various forms of international coordination in case of signi…cant global crop shortages. Our study suggests that coordinated action by export nations may in such instances be desirable. However, from a world welfare view, the coordination would have to be temporarily limited to times of serious crop failures.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Assuming P t (x; x; t) 6 = P i (x i ) + t i for i = 1; 2 straightforward calculations lead to
Since X S i (x i ; t i ; P t ( )) and X S (P t ( )) are linear in P t ( ) (see (3) and (7)), we also have @ 2 P t ( ) @x 2 = 0. Furthermore, assuming P i (x i )+t i < P t (x; x; t) < P j (x j )+t j for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j, (14) shows that @P t ( )/ @x has a downward kink at x such that P t (x; x; t) = P j (x j ) + t j .
Proof of Lemma 2 Straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 1 The properties of P t imply that k (x k ; x l ; ) is continuous in x k . Employing Lemma 1 shows that for all x k such that P t 6 = P i (x i ) + t i ; P i (0) + t i holds for i = 1; 2, k (x k ; x l ; ) is twice di¤erentiable and
which also implies 0 > @X r k (x l ; x; t)=@x l > 1 as long as
With P i (x i ) + t i 6 = P j (0) + t j for i; j = 1; 2; j 6 = i we have
If k (x k ; x l ; ) has a local maximum at X m k (x l ; x; t) such that P t (X m k + x l ; x; t) 6 = P i (x i ) + t i ; P i (0) + t i , the envelope theorem implies
Assume now that k (x k ; x l ; ) has a local maximum at X m k (x l ; x; t) such that P t (X m k + x l ; x; t) = P i (0) + t i and
Combining these results and taking into account that P (x k +x l ) P t (x k +x l ; x; t) is strictly decreasing in x k , we get that if X r k (x l ; x; t) has more than one element X 1m k (x l ; x; t) < X 2m k (x l ; x; t) < ::: < X N m k (x l ; x; t) with N 2 a small variation in x l implies
(with " > 0 but small enough). Hence, the best reply X r k (x l ; x; t) involves an 'upward jump'at x l . Note also that there are no downward jumps as the best reply is continuous in x l if P t (X r k (x l ; x; t) + x l ; x; t) = P i (0) + t i . Finally, using X r k (0; x; t) > 0 = lim x l !1 X r k (x l ; x; t) shows that a symmetric equilibrium X k (x; t) = X l (x; t) always exists.
Proof of Lemma 3 Assume that X (x; t) is unique and x i > X S i (x; t) > 0 for at least one i 2 f1; 2g. Totally di¤erentiating
with respect to x i , solving for @X k / @x i and @P t / @x i and de…ning :=
and, thus,
Since
Di¤erentiating (24) and (25) with respect to t i and solving for @X k / @t i and @P t / @t i we obtain
as well as
Finally, using the envelope theorem we get
Proof of Lemma 4 Assume that two equilibria X (x; t) and X (x; t) such that X (x; t) < X (x; t) and P i (x i ) + t i < P t (2X (x; t)); x; t) < P j (x i ) + t j < P t (2X (x; t)); x; t) for i 6 = j exist. The …rst part of the lemma follows from k (X r k (X ; x; t); X l ; t) > k (X r k (X ; x; t); X l ; t) > k (X r k (X ; x; t); X ; t).
To prove the second part of the lemma let X l (t i ; t j ) (l 6 = k) be the quantity x l such that X r k (x l ; x; t) has two elements X r k < X r k with
and de…ne P := P (X r k + X l ), P t := P t (X r k + X l ; x; t), P = P X r k + X l and P t := P t (X r k + X l ; x; t). Using
as well as the respective …rst order conditions for X r k and X r k , comparative statics of X l (t i ; t j ) with respect to t i lead to
< 0 with = P P t 1 P 0 @X S i @P t + X S0 (p) and = P P t
Similarly, we get @X l (t i ; t j ) @t j X = P P t (P P t )
Proof of Lemma 5 Partial di¤erentiation of W i with respect to t i leads to 
Proof of Lemma 6 If max t i W i ( ) has an interior solution t r i (t i ; x) such that a unique equilibrium X (x; t) exists, uniqueness of t r i follows from quasi-concavity of V i (CR i (x i x S i )) and linearity of X S i . Solving @W i / @t i = 0 for V 0 i we get Considering the impact of t j and x j on t r i , assuming that t r i (t i ; x) leads to 0 < X S j (x; t) < 
as well as @P t / @x j = @P t / @x i < 0 we get and @P t / @t i < 1. To prove @t r i / @t j < 1 it su¢ ces to show that
Simple calculations lead to 
